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By KANG H. PARK* 
This paper examines market concentration and its effect on 
competition in the Chinese commercial banking market. This study 
also investigates how changes in competition have affected the 
financial stability of Chinese commercial banks. To test the 
competitive conditions, we obtained the H statistic of the Panzar-
Rosse model from a revenue function equation. The degree of financial 
stability is estimated by the Z-score formula. The Chinese banking 
industry has become an increasingly less concentrated market with an 
increased number of banks. Along with a decreased market 
concentration, competition in the Chinese banking industry has 
improved moderately. However, its market structure is still far from a 
competitive market. An individual bank’s ability to earn higher markup 
or charge a higher net interest margin contributes to its financial 
soundness, although a higher degree of market concentration may 
have negative effect on the financial stability of the entire banking 
system. 
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   I. Introduction 
 
he last three decades have witnessed a surge in bank mergers. Although firm 
mergers have occurred for a long time, the mergers during the past twenty 
years, known collectively as the “fifth merger wave,” have been the most 
remarkable. The banking industry did not escape the merger wave. Banking 
industries all over the world have experienced a fundamental change in their 
market structure through rapid consolidation. Financial deregulation and financial
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globalization triggered fierce competition among banks and necessitated 
consolidation to reduce risk through business diversification and to take advantage 
of economies of scale. 
The Chinese banking system has undergone a different path of structural change, 
transforming from a mono-bank system to a “several-tiered” banking system over 
the last 30-plus years. Several measures of financial liberalization and restructuring 
have been established to improve competitiveness in the commercial banking 
industry since the 1990s. There have been many bank foreclosures, takeovers and 
mergers in China, as in many other countries. However, the number of new banks 
appearing in the Chinese banking market has far exceeded the number of banks 
which have disappeared.  
Until 1978, there was one single bank, the People’s Bank of China. Then, as part 
of its economic reforms, the Chinese government authorized four state-owned 
commercial banks between 1979 and 1984, with limited competition among them. 
Since then the Chinese government has allowed many joint-equity banks and 
private banks in order to mobilize the financial resources needed for economic 
development. Furthermore, it authorized several policy banks and local (or city) 
banks as well as joint-equity banks in the 1990s as a measure of financial 
liberalization in preparation for entry into the World Trade Organization. All of 
these developments have contributed to a continuous decrease in the degree of 
market concentration of the Chinese banking industry. It may be worthwhile to 
examine whether and how much the decreased market concentration in the Chinese 
banking industry has improved the competitiveness of the banking sector in China. 
The purpose of this paper is empirically to investigate whether changes in the 
concentration of Chinese banks affected the competition and stability of the 
Chinese commercial banking market for the period of 1992-2008. The degree of 
competition is estimated by the H statistic of the Panzar-Rosse model, while 
financial stability is estimated by the Z score formula. This paper is organized as 
follows. The next section describes developments in the Chinese commercial 
banking market and analyzes the market concentration trends in the Chinese 
banking industry. This is followed by a section which reviews the literature on 
bank competition and financial stability. Section IV discusses the methodology 
used to assess the degree of competition in the empirical analysis. Section V 
describes the data and interprets the estimates of the model. Section 6 investigates 
the relationship between competition and financial stability. The last section 
provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
II. Developments in the Chinese Banking Industry and  
Changes in Bank Concentration 
 
Before Deng Xiao Ping’s 1978 reforms, China had a single bank, the People’s 
Bank of China, playing both the role of a central bank and those associated with 
commercial banking, in order to channel funds in accordance with the state plan. 
With the reforms, four specialized state banks were derived from the People’s Bank 
of China between 1979 and 1984 to form a two-tier banking system in China, 
leaving the People’s Bank of China (PBC) solely functioning as China’s central 
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bank. The four state commercial banks which split from the People’s Bank of 
China are the Bank of China (BOC), the Construction Bank of China (CBC), the 
Industrial and Commerce Bank of China (ICBC) and the Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC). The intention of the creation of these specialized banks was to 
provide banking services to specific sectors of the economy. For example, the BOC 
is to specialize in foreign-exchange transactions and trade finance, the CBC is to 
specialize in medium- to long-term credit for long-term infrastructure projects and 
urban housing development, the ICBC acts as the major supplier of funds to 
China’s urban areas and manufacturing sector, and the ABC is to specialize in 
providing financing to China’s agricultural sector while also offering wholesale and 
retail banking services to farmers.  
Despite the fact that restrictions on these specialized banks to do business in 
only their designated areas were removed in 1985, competition among them 
remained very limited until the mid-1990s. There was a boost to competition when 
the Chinese government authorized the establishment of three policy banks. These 
three banks are the China Development Bank (CDB), the Export Import Bank of 
China (EIBC), and the Agricultural and Development Bank of China (ADBC). The 
CDB was chartered to provide long-term lending to finance construction projects 
for infrastructure and leading industries. The EIBC was established to provide 
loans for the exports and imports of capital goods. The ADBC provides agricultural 
lending. 
To enhance competition in the Chinese commercial banking market, the Chinese 
government launched a second round of bank reforms in the 1990s. A variety of 
new bank types were created, including joint-equity banks, local (or city) banks, 
and foreign banks. This time, 14 joint-equity banks were established, where shares 
were held by the government, cooperatives and the private sector. These banks are 
the Bank of Communication, China Merchants Bank, Shenzhen Development 
Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Pudong Development Bank, China 
Everbright Bank, China Minsheng Banking Corporation, Hua Xia Bank, Fuijin 
Industrial Bank, Hainan Development Bank, China Investment Bank, Yantai 
Housing Saving Bank and Bengbu Housing Saving Bank. During the mid-1990s, 
the central government allowed local governments to establish local (or city) 
banks. The number of banks continuously increased each year. China, with four 
state-owned commercial megabanks, now runs four of the world’s five largest 
banks as a consequence of the reduced market value of U.S. and other western 
banks due to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Among the bank reforms in China, the most noteworthy is the joint-equity 
reform of the four large state-owned banks owing to its impact on the overall 
economy. A special treasury bond which amounted to US$32.61 billion was issued 
in 1998 to strengthen the capital requirements of the four banks, raising their equity 
ratio to 8%. Four asset management corporations were established to purchase the 
non-performing loans from the four banks, resulting in a reduction of their non-
performing loan ratio by 10%. These four banks took measures to improve their 
operational efficiency by eliminating more than 55,000 branches and laying nearly 
363,000 employees off. Over 2003-2005, the BOC, CBC and ICBC received 
capital injections from the Chinese government in an amount of $62 billion.  
Along with the bank reforms, the Chinese government gradually introduced 
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market-determined interest rates guided by the central bank rate, and the central 
bank implemented the liberalization of interest rates. The gradual liberalization of 
interest rates took place in steps: liberalizing the foreign currency interest rate prior 
to the domestic currency interest rate, liberalizing the lending rate prior to the 
deposit rate, and liberalizing the large and long-term fund rates prior to the small 
and short-term fund rates. This type of the gradual interest rate deregulation 
provided incentives for banks to strengthen their asset and liability management 
practices and to earn more profits. A nationwide unified inter-bank market had been 
created by the end of the 1990s, and both the inter-bank lending rate and the inter-
bank bond market rate had been liberalized, thus offering financial institutions 
more of an incentive to adjust the composition of their assets by reducing their 
excess reserves while increasing the amount of bonds they held as assets. Banks 
were also given more autonomy to improve their competitiveness by trading in 
stock markets and making foreign equity investments.   
China’s joining the WTO had a major impact on the operation of foreign banks 
in China and on their involvement in the ownership and management of domestic 
banks. According to China’s commitment to the WTO, all restrictions imposed on 
the ownership and operation of foreign banks, including restrictions on licenses and 
the number of branches, had to be removed by 2006. Furthermore, foreign banks 
became entitled to treatment equal to that of Chinese domestic banks, and the 
Chinese government allowed foreign banks to own up to 25% of domestic banks. 
By 2008, foreign banks had equity investments in three state-owned commercial 
banks, nine joint-equity banks and many local (or city) banks. 
There are a number of ways to measure the degree of market concentration. The 
most widely used index is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This index is 
applied by the US Department of Justice in its effort to implement its antitrust 
policies. Another straightforward method is to calculate the share of the industry’s 
output or assets that is owned by a few dominant firms. This top-k firm 
concentration ratio (CRk) is used by some governments to determine the degree of 
anti-competition of a proposed merger. Figure 1 presents the HHI and CR4 of the 
total assets of China. We obtained the HHI and CR4 of three variables, that is, total 
assets, total loans and total deposits, finding that the correlation coefficients of the 
HHI and CR4 among the three variables all exceed 0.99. Therefore, only the HHI 
and CR4 of total assets are shown in Figure 1. 
The higher the CR4 and HHI, the more concentrated the market is. Both the CR4 
and HHI show a moderately decreasing trend over time; CR4 decreased from 94% 
in 1992 to 61% in 2008, while the HHI decreased from 2743 in 1992 to 1642 in 
2008. This clearly indicates that the market concentration of the Chinese banking 
market continually decreased for the period of 1992-2008. This change is mostly 
attributable to changes in banking policies made by the Chinese government, which 
allowed the establishment of more banks and promoted competition among them. 
In spite of several mergers of banks in recent years, the number of new banks 
created far exceeded the number of banks undergoing foreclosure and a merger. 
The Chinese banking industry, even with the gradual decrease in its market 
concentration, is still a highly concentrated market compared to those in other 
countries. Figure 2 shows the HHI of domestic deposits among a few selected 
countries. China is not included in this sample, but China would be at the high end  
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FIGURE 1 
Source: 1) HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and CR4 is the 
concentration ratio as measured by the market share of the largest four banks. 
2) Total assets are used to calculate CR4 and HHI. Total assets include assets 
in both banking accounts and trust accounts.   
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Source: Celent analysis, annual report, central banks 
 
of this range, along with Russia and Canada, while Germany and the US are at the 
low end of the range. 
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III. Survey of the Literature 
 
In this section, theoretical models and empirical findings pertaining to bank 
competition are briefly reviewed. Although many studies have been conducted in an 
effort to investigate the effect of bank consolidation on competition, there is little 
consensus on an appropriate theoretical framework, and the empirical findings are 
inconclusive. Gilbert (1984) provides a comprehensive survey of earlier studies and 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) do so for later studies. The concern about the effect of 
consolidation on competition arises from the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm, which dates back to Mason (1939). The SCP model suggests that 
increasing market concentration leads to less competitive conduct in terms of higher 
prices and less output and results in higher profits at the expense of lower consumer 
welfare. This paradigm is the basis of what is termed the “collusion” hypothesis. 
Although there is a theoretical basis for these linkages, other equilibrium 
conditions can lead to different relationships between market concentration and 
conduct. As long as there are no sunk costs and hit-and-run entry is possible, then 
market contestability can yield competitive pricing regardless of the number of firms 
(Baumol et al. 1982). The efficient structure hypothesis advances that efficient banks 
obtain higher profitability and a greater market share due to their efficiency, which 
will lead to a more concentrated market. Therefore, the association between structure 
and performance may be spurious unless efficiency is controlled for in the model 
(Smirlock 1985). Adverse borrower selection may result in spurious empirical SCP 
linkages as well (Shaffer 2002).  
Empirical results on the SCP paradigm are mixed. According to Gilbert (1984), 
many studies presented a mixed set of results in the aggregate and tended to display 
various methodological flaws. Weiss (1989) reported that only 21 out of 47 studies 
support the SCP model. More recent studies find that bank profitability is unrelated 
or even inversely related to concentration when controlling for efficiency and market 
share (Berger 1995). Conversely, collusive actions can be found even in non-
concentrated markets (Calem and Carlino 1991; Shaffer 1999). 
Two empirical methods have been developed to address the shortcomings of the 
SCP model by testing the conduct directly, without regard to the industry structure. 
The first of these is the Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) model (B-L model), which 
estimates the price markup over the marginal cost as a measure of market power. 
Thus, this method is also termed the markup test. This model is based on two 
structural equations, an inverse demand equation and a supply equation derived from 
the first-order condition of profit maximization. The following studies apply the B-L 
model empirically. Shaffer (1989) rejects the collusive conduct hypothesis with a 
sample of US banks, and Shaffer (1993) finds that Canadian banks were competitive 
for the period 1965-1989, even with a relatively concentrated market. Berg and Kim 
(1994) show that Cournot behavior is rejected in the Norwegian banking system. 
Fuentes and Sartre (1998) find that bank consolidation in Spain did not weaken the 
competition level. Gruben and McComb (2003) find regarding Mexican banks before 
1995 that marginal prices were set below marginal costs and conclude that the 
Mexican market is super-competitive.  
Another means of overcoming the shortcomings of the SCP model is to use the 
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Panzar-Rosse (1977) model (P-R model). This model measures the extent to which a 
change in a vector of input prices is reflected in the gross revenue. Thus, the method 
is also called the revenue test. If the market is perfectly competitive, the change will 
then be fully reflected in the revenue. Shaffer (2004) compares and contrasts both 
methods in detail and discusses their advantages and disadvantages. Numerous 
studies apply the P-R model empirically, beginning with Shaffer (1983), who finds 
monopolistic competition with a sample of New York banks in 1979. Nathan and 
Neave (1989) reject the hypothesis of the monopoly power of Canadian banks. 
Country-specific empirical studies include Vesala (1995) for Finland, Molyneux et al. 
(1996) for Japan, Coccorese (1998) for Italy, Hondroyiannis (1999) for Greece, and 
Hempell (2002) for Germany. Molyneux et al. (1994) and Bikker and Groeneveld 
(2000) find monopolistic competition in several European countries. On the other 
hand, De Bandt and Davis (2000) find monopolistic competition for large banks and 
monopolies for small banks in Germany and France. Bikker and Haaf (2002) find 
that the banking industries in 23 OECD countries for the period 1998-1999 are 
generally characterized by monopolistic competition, with the exception of Australia 
and Greece. Gelos and Roldos (2002) compare eight European and Latin American 
countries and find that the bank consolidation process in its early stage does not 
lower competition.  
Molyneux et al. (1996) find that the Japanese banking market was under 
monopoly or conjectural variations of a short-run oligopoly in 1986, though the 
situation had improved with regard to the level of monopolistic competition by 1988. 
Uchida and Tsutsui (2005), from long-term Japanese panel data from 1974 to 2000, 
conclude that market competition improved during the 1970s and 1980s but has 
worsened since 1997. There are many studies on the efficiency and profitability of 
Korean banks, including that by Park and Weber (2006a, 2006b). However, very few 
researchers have studied competition with regard to Korean banks. Lee and Nagano 
(2008) report that market concentration brought about by bank mergers does not 
necessarily result in low competition in Japan and Korea. Park (2009) concludes that 
the Korean banking industry is monopolistically competitive, except during the Asian 
financial crisis period, from panel data of 1992-2004. Studies of bank competition in 
China are scant and mostly descriptive rather than analytical. Wong and Wong (2001) 
describe the trends of bank concentration ratios during the 90s, and Yuan (2006) 
examines the state of Chinese banking competition for 1996-2000. The present study 
applies the P-R model to the data of the Chinese banks. 
Regarding the relationship between competition and financial stability, there are 
two opposing schools of thoughts. The competition-fragility school argues that 
competition drives banks to undertake more risk, while larger banks in concentrated 
banking systems can reduce their financial fragility by providing more robust capital 
buffers (Allen and Gale 2004; Boyd et al. 2006). The opposing school, believing in 
the competition-stability linkage, argues that competition leads to more stability. 
More credit rationing, more competitive lower loan rates and less managerial 
inefficiency in a less concentrated banking system reduce risk-taking behavior and 
decrease the probability of bank failure, though banks with more power may engage 
in more risk-taking behavior (Boyd and DeNicoló 2005; Beck et al. 2010; Turk-Ariss 
2010). This study will test these opposing models with Chinese bank data. 
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IV. Model 
 
The P-R model is used to assess the competitive nature of the Chinese banking 
industry because this model is robust to the extent that market- and bank-level data 
are available. Let a bank’s revenue function be R = R (x, y1), where x is a vector of 
products and y1 is a vector of exogenous variables shifting the revenue function, and 
let a bank’s cost function be C = C (x, w, y2), where w is a vector of input prices and 
y2 is a vector of exogenous variables shifting the cost function. y1 and y2 may have 
common variables. 
Profit maximization by the bank requires that marginal revenue is equal to 
marginal cost, as R’ (x, y1) = C’ (x, w, y2). Panzar and Rosse (1987) calculate the sum 
of the elasticities of revenue with respect to input prices from the reduced-form 
revenue equation and define it as the H-statistic. 
 
(1)                        i iH R / w w / R        
 
Here, wi is the ith input price. Panzar and Rosse show from the profit maximization 
condition that the H-statistic is equal to unity (H=1) in a perfectly competitive market 
and is less than or equal to zero (H ≤ 0) under a monopoly. Although the Panzar-
Rosse article also shows that 0 < H < 1 could be consistent with oligopolistic 
behavior, it is common to regard 0 < H < 1 as a condition of Chamberlinian 
monopolistic competition. This interpretation is valid under the assumption that the 
observations are in long-run equilibrium (Nathan and Neave 1989).  
Following Park (2009), we specify the reduced-form revenue equation of a bank as 
follows, 
  
(2)        it 1 1,it 2 2,it 3 3,it k k itln R ln w ln w ln w z ,             
 
where Rit is bank i’s revenue at time t, w1 is the input price of labor, w2 is the input 
price of capital, w3 is the input price of funds, and zk is a vector of control variables 
affecting the bank’s revenue function. The H-statistic is the sum of β1, β2 and β3. In 
order to eliminate the manual calculation of β1 + β2 + β3 and its standard error, 
equation (2) can be rearranged as follows. 
 
(3)            it 1 1,it 3,it 2 2,it 3,itln R =α+β ln w -ln w +β ln w -ln w         
   1 2 3 3,it k k itln w z            
 
The H-statistic is estimated by the coefficient of ln(w3,it), and its standard error is 
used to test the significance of this estimate.  
The P-R model is constructed under the assumption that the market is in 
equilibrium. Consequently, following Panzar and Rosse (1977, 1987), Shaffer 
(1983), Molyneux et al. (1996), Claessens and Laeven (2004), and Park (2009), 
equation (4) is used to test the equilibrium conditions. 
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(4)          it 1 1,it 2 2,it 3 3,it k k itln ROA ln w ln w ln w z              
 
In equilibrium, rates of return on assets should not be statistically correlated with 
factor prices (H=0), particularly if the market is perfectly competitive. On the other 
hand, if the market is in disequilibrium, an increase in factor prices would result in a 
temporary decline in the rates of return (H<0). 
 
V. Empirical Analysis 
 
Revenue (Rit) is typically measured as interest revenue or with its ratio to total 
assets, presuming that the main function of banks is financial intermediation. 
However, with the weakening of financial intermediation in recent years and the 
diversification of bank assets, total revenue or its ratio to total assets is used in 
some studies. We use both interest revenue (IR) and total revenue (TR) in this 
study. ROA is the ratio of net after-tax income to total assets in percentage. The 
unit labor cost (w1,it) is measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to the number 
of employees, the unit capital cost (w2,it) is measured by the ratio of the 
depreciation allowance and other maintenance costs to the total fixed assets, and 
the unit funding cost (w3,it) is measured by the ratio of interest expenses to the sum 
of total deposits and borrowings. As personnel expenses are not available in more 
detail, it is not possible to have differing levels of human capital.    
Several control variables are included in the model. Total assets (ASSET) are 
included to observe the size effect and the number of branches (BRANCH) is 
included to account for the effect of the bank network. The ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans (NPL) is included to control for the credit risk effect. The equity 
ratio (EQUITY) is alternatively used as a control variable for credit market and 
operational risk. The ratio of non-interest revenue to total revenue (NINT) is 
included to reflect the effect of changing financial intermediation or diversification. 
The variable BRANCH, representing the bank network, was eventually deleted 
from the regression estimation due to its high correlation with ASSET. Bikker et al. 
(2006) state that the inclusion of a scale explanatory variable such as ASSET in the 
Panzar-Rosse model may lead to an overestimation of the level of competition and 
may distort the tests of monopoly and perfect competition. Therefore, we estimate 
competitive conditions in both ways, with and without the scale explanatory 
variable ASSET. However, the H values, regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of 
ASSET in the model, show similar test results with no indication that the inclusion 
of a scale explanatory variable causes an overestimation of the level of 
competition. Thus, in the sections below, we only report the estimation results with 
the inclusion of ASSET in the model. The fixed-effects model is used for the 
estimation to reflect bank-specific characteristics and to control for heterogeneity 
among the banks.  
Data used for China are from Bank Scope, the Almanac of Chinese Banking and 
Finance, and from China Financial Yearbooks. Although China has many banks, 
only 15 major banks are included in the sample because data availability is limited. 
A similar sample size is used in Yuan (2006). This limitation of the data tends to 
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overstate the degree of market concentration. However, any overstatement of HHI 
would be of a small magnitude, as these 15 banks account for most of the total 
bank deposits in China, more than 90% in the earlier period and more than 80% in 
the later period. Furthermore, an overstatement of HHI has no effect on the H 
statistic, a measure of competition, which is our main concern here. The fifteen 
Chinese banks are the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China (ADBC), China Development Bank (CDB), the Bank 
of Communications, China CITIC Bank, China Everbright Bank, China Minsheng 
Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China 
Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and Industrial Bank. 
 
A. Equilibrium Condition Test 
 
As the P-R model is constructed on the assumption of market equilibrium, the 
equilibrium condition test is done before the competition condition test. The second 
column in Table 1 gives the estimation results of equation (4) with the dependent 
variable, lnROA, for the full sample period. Because the rate of return on assets of 
some banks can be negative, the dependent variable is actually computed as ln 
(1+ROA), where ROA is the ratio of net after-tax income to total assets. Several 
troubled Chinese state and joint-equity banks in their earlier years had negative 
rates of return on assets. Adding 1 to the ROA before taking the logarithm is 
arbitrary, but it is a common method used to handle non-positive numbers in 
logarithmic transformations. Bos and Koetter (2006) point out that adding 1 affects 
the composition of total error but does not affect the coefficient estimates, which 
are our main concern.  
 
TABLE 1—TEST OF EQUILIBRIUM CONDITION:  
ESTIMATION RESULTS OF EQUATION (4) DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LNROA 
 Full Sample Period Pre-2000 Period Post-2000 Period
lnW1  -0.009 
(0.243) 
0.014 
(0.157) 
0.002* 
(0.081) 
lnW2  0.007 
(0.296) 
0.005 
(0.375) 
0.004 
(0.204) 
lnW3 -0.058** 
(0.032) 
-0.041 
(0.162) 
0.008** 
(0.026) 
lnASSET 0.022* 
(0.063) 
0.043** 
(0.028) 
0.014* 
(0.059) 
NINT 0.004 
(0.457) 
0.002 
(0.597) 
0.007 
(0.287) 
NPL -0.012** 
(0.046) 
-0.006 
(0.147) 
-0.025** 
(0.019) 
EQUITY 0.002 
(0.186) 
0.001 
(0.285) 
0.005 
(0.139) 
ADJ. R2 0.378 0.342 0.489 
Wald test: H=0
(ρ-value) 
5.712** 
(0.017) 
2.431 
 (0.121) 
1.937 
(0.194) 
Eq. vs. Diseq. Disequilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium 
Source: 1) Estimation results of the fixed-effects model. 2) The coefficients of the 
constant under the fixed-effects model are not reported here because there are as 
many as the number of banks. 3) ρ values are shown in parentheses. * and ** 
indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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The hypothesis that the market is in equilibrium, that is, H = 0, is rejected for the 
full sample period at the 2% level of significance. The continuous influx of banks 
over time and the rapid changes in the structure of the Chinese commercial banking 
industry may have resulted in a disequilibrium condition. Shaffer (2004) stated that 
this restriction of the equilibrium condition, that is, H = 0, is necessary only for a 
case of perfect competition, whereas it is not necessarily required for a case of 
monopolistic competition. The finding of a disequilibrium condition is not a critical 
issue, as this paper does not claim that the commercial banking industry in China is 
perfectly competitive. However, the cause of and solution for the disequilibrium 
condition are investigated further below.  
The Chinese government has introduced many reforms in its financial sectors 
since year 2000 in an effort to join the WTO (World Trade Organization) and China 
finally succeeded in joining WTO in December of 2001. Due to several bank 
reforms and major restructuring in the financial sector during this period, there 
exist different bank competitive conditions between the pre-2000 period and the 
post-2000 period. The Chow breakpoint test is used to determine whether there is 
no significant difference in the estimated equation (4) between the two sub-sample 
periods, that is, the pre-2000 period and the post-2000 period. The null hypothesis 
of no structural change is rejected with an F-statistic of 21.38 for the Chow 
breakpoint test. Therefore, equation (4) is re-estimated for each sub-sample period 
and its results are reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 1. The 
hypothesis that the market is in equilibrium, i.e., H = 0, cannot be rejected for each 
sub-sample period. 
 
B. Competition Condition Test 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of equation (2) with the dependent 
variables of lnIR and lnTR along with the H-statistic, which is sum of β1, β2 and β3.  
According to the Wald test, which is a test for a competition condition, the 
hypothesis of a monopolistic market structure (H=0) and the hypothesis of a 
perfectly competitive market structure (H=1) are rejected at the 1% level. We re- 
estimate equation (2) for each sub-sample period. For the pre-2000 period, the 
hypothesis of H=1 is rejected, but the hypothesis of H=0 cannot be rejected at the 
1% level. For the post-2000 period, both H=0 and H=1 are rejected at the 1% level. 
These results indicate that there has been a dramatic change in the competition 
level of the Chinese banking industry over time. 
The values of the H statistic for the Chinese banking industry with the full 
sample are very small regardless of which revenue (lnIR or lnTR) is used as a 
dependent variable. This result indicates that the Chinese banking market is still far 
from being a competitive market. It is rather characterized as having an 
oligopolistic market structure in the earlier period and a monopolistic market 
structure in the later period. Relatively high adjusted R2 values indicate the 
goodness of fit for all of the regressions in Table 2. All coefficients of the input 
costs, that is, the unit labor cost (w1,it), the unit capital cost (w2,it) and the unit 
funding cost (w3,it), have positive signs, as expected. However, their coefficient size 
is small and some coefficients are not statistically significant. 
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TABLE 2—TEST OF COMPETITION CONDITION:  
ESTIMATION RESULTS OF EQUATION (2) 
  Sample Period Pre-2000 Period  Post-2000 Period 
lnIR lnTR lnIR lnTR lnIR lnTR 
lnW1  0.116** 
(0.021) 
0.131** 
(0.034) 
0.108**
(0.027) 
0.112** 
(0.041) 
0.219**  
(0.018) 
0.204**  
(0.022) 
lnW2  0.023 
(0.132) 
0.035 
(0.142) 
0.029 
(0.153) 
0.022 
(0.126) 
0.036* 
(0.071) 
0.069  
(0.113)  
lnW3 0.078** 
(0.033) 
0.081** 
(0.028) 
0.064**
(0.042) 
0.072* 
(0.058) 
0.097** 
(0.018) 
 0.109** 
(0.019)  
lnASSET 1.066***
(0.001) 
1.009***
(0.001) 
1.253***
(0.001) 
1.357***
(0.001) 
0.938*** 
(0.001) 
0.825*** 
(0.001)  
NINT -0.027 
(0.193) 
0.094 
(0.176) 
-0.012 
(0.139) 
0.062 
(0.155) 
-0.049  
(0.261) 
0.109 
(0.229)  
NPL -0.004***
(0.001) 
-0.006***
(0.001) 
-0.002***
(0.001) 
-0.004***
(0.001) 
 -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
EQUITY 0.013 
(0.127) 
0.014 
(0.116) 
0.009 
(0.139) 
0.008 
(0.124) 
0.019 
(0.143)  
0.021  
(0.119) 
ADJ. R2 0.592 0.623 0.504 0.572 0.721 0.698  
H statistic 0.233***
(0.001) 
0.245***
(0.001) 
0.199***
(0.001) 
0.208***
(0.001) 
0.369*** 
(0.001) 
 0.385*** 
(0.001) 
Wald test: H=0, 
ρ-value 
23.92*** 
(0.000) 
29.32*** 
(0.000) 
3.22* 
(0.071) 
3.57* 
(0.062) 
35.33*** 
(0.000)  
39.17*** 
(0.000) 
Wald test: H=1 
ρ-value 
512.93*** 
(0.000) 
575.62*** 
(0.000) 
714.73***
(0.000) 
693.09*** 
(0.000) 
447.28*** 
(0.000)  
419.26*** 
(0.000)  
Source: 1) lnIR is the natural logarithm of interest revenue while lnTR is the natural logarithm of total revenue. 2) 
The coefficients of the constant under the fixed-effects model are not reported here because there are as many as 
the number of banks. 3) ρ values are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 4) H statistic and its ρ value are obtained by estimating Equation 3. 
 
The significant and positive sign of ASSET indicates the strong presence of a 
size effect. NINT (the ratio of non-interest revenue to total revenue) has no 
significant effect on either interest revenue or total revenue. The dominant source 
of Chinese banks’ revenue is still interest revenue, indicating no sign of weakening 
of the financial intermediary function of banks in China, in contrast to the trend of 
the weakening financial intermediary function of banks in Japan and Korea. Only 
recently have certain Chinese banks expanded their business into non-loan-related 
activities. While NPL has a significant negative effect on lnIR or lnTR, as 
expected, equity ratio does not have a significant positive effect on them. 
According to the signal theory (Berger 1995), banks that expect to have better 
performance in terms of profitability credibly transmit this information through a 
higher equity ratio. There appears to be no strong signaling effect of the equity 
ratio on profitability in China. In other words, higher profit probability of Chinese 
banks has not been signaled through a higher equity ratio.             
 
C. Trend of the H Value over Time 
 
To determine how the values of the H static changed over time, this statistic is 
estimated for moving three-year time periods, that is, 1992-1994, 1993-1995, 1994-
1996 and so on. The estimation results of the H statistic are reported together with 
HHI in Table 3.  
Market concentration as measured by HHI declined continuously from 2743 in  
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TABLE 3—MARKET CONCENTRATION AND COMPETITION LEVEL OVER TIME 
Year HHI - Total Assets H-statistic with lnIR H-statistic with lnTR 
1992-1994 2652 0.136 0.149 
1993-1995 2583 0.164 0.174 
1994-1996 2525 0.182 0.192 
1995-1997 2415 0.207 0.228 
1996-1998 2301 0.215 0.247 
1997-1999 2184 0.233 0.269 
1998-2000 2116 0.259 0.278 
1999-2001 2053 0.271 0.299 
2000-2002 2008 0.298 0.321 
2001-2003 1931 0.302 0.343 
2002-2004 1859 0.342 0.338 
2003-2005 1779 0.365 0.376 
2004-2006 1734 0.389 0.402 
2005-2007 1694 0.405 0.427 
2006-2008 1666 0.426 0.449 
 
1992 to 1642 in 2008. The H statistic with both lnIR and lnTR increased gradually 
over the same time period, from less than .15 in the earlier period to more than .4 in 
the later period. Hence, these two variables exhibit a high negative correlation. The 
correlation coefficient between HHI and the H statistic with lnIR is -0.974, while 
the correlation coefficient between HHI and the H statistic with lnTR is -0.976. The 
decrease in the market concentration of the Chinese banking sector unquestionably 
contributed to an improvement in the banking competition level in China, although 
the effect may be mild. 
 
D. Comparison between Korea and China 
 
Contrary to the increasing trend of market concentration in the Korean banking 
industry, the Chinese banking system has experienced a continually decreasing 
market concentration. According to Park (2009), the Korean banking industry 
experienced an increase in the HHI of assets from 876 in 1992 to 1325 in 2004. 
This study finds that the HHI of assets in China decreased from 2743 in 1994 to 
1642 in 2008. Bank merger activities and the creation of a few megabanks in Korea 
contributed to the increasing trend of banking market concentration. On the other 
hand, the financial liberalization policy of the Chinese government has increased 
the creation of new banks year after year, contributing to the decreasing trend of 
banking market concentration.  
The H-statistic sheds light on the differences in the market structures between 
Korea and China. Park (2009), in his study on Korean banking, reports that the H-
statistic value for either interest revenue or total revenue ranges from .511 to .659 
during the stable period, which excludes the Asian financial crisis period. This 
indicates that the Korean banking market is monopolistically competitive. On the 
other hand, this study finds that the H-statistic value for either interest revenue or 
total revenue ranges from .211 to .385, implying a market structure closer to an 
oligopoly in the Chinese commercial banking market. 
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VI. Effect on Financial Stability 
 
In this section, we investigate how bank competition affects the financial 
stability of Chinese banks. While competition among banks influences bank 
stability, bank competition may also be affected by the degree of financial stability, 
as banks may utilize a different competition strategy depending on the stability 
condition, causing the endogeneity problem of competition variables. Following 
Boyd et al. (2006) and Beck et al. (2010), we deployed lagged variables of the 
explanatory variables in the following estimation equation to address this 
endogeneity problem. 
 
(5)       it k k ,i t 1 k k ,i t 1 k k ,t 1 itZ C X Y               
 
In this equation, Zit represents the Z score of bank i at time t; Ck,i t-1 are variables 
indicating the competitiveness of bank i at time t-1, such as the net interest margin 
and the Lerner index; Xk,i t-1 are bank-specific variables of bank i at time t-1, such as 
the equity ratio, the share of non-performing loans and the number of branches; and 
Yk,t-1 are macroeconomic variables such as the economic growth rate, the inflation 
rate at time t-1 and two dummy variables, one representing the crisis period and 
another representing the post-2000 period. The Z score is calculated as the sum of a 
bank’s asset returns and the capital-to-assets ratio divided by the standard deviation 
of asset returns. Therefore, the Z score can be interpreted as the number of standard 
deviations that a bank’s return on assets has to drop below its expected value before 
equity is depleted and the bank becomes insolvent. A higher Z score indicates that a 
bank is more stable and thus has less probability of failing. 
We use two variables, the Lerner index and the net interest margin, as our 
measure of bank competition, with HHI as a measure of market concentration. 
While the H statistic shows the degree of competition for the entire banking 
industry, it does not show individual banks’ levels of competitiveness. Accordingly, 
the Leaner index and the net interest margin instead of the H statistic are used to 
determine how individual banks’ competitiveness levels affect bank stability. The 
Lerner index, which measures the mark-up of prices over marginal costs, indicates 
the degree of market power. It is calculated as 
 
 it it it itL P MC / P ,    
 
where Pit is the price of total assets of bank i at time t, measured by the ratio of 
total revenues to total assets; MCit is the marginal cost of bank i at time t. 
Following Turk-Ariss (2010), the marginal cost of bank i at time t is calculated as 
follows, 
 
(6)           k kMC TC / Q ln Q ln W T ,         
 
where TC denotes total expenses, Q is total assets, and Wk represents the three input 
prices of labor, fixed capital and funding. T (Trend) is used to capture technical 
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TABLE 4—ESTIMATION RESULTS OF EQUATION (5),  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LN Z SCORE 
 
Source: 1) Estimation results of fixed-effects model. The coefficients of the constant under the 
fixed-effects model are not reported here. 2) ρ values are shown in parentheses. * and ** 
indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
changes in the cost function over time. Equation (6) is scaled by the unit labor cost 
(ln W3) to account for heteroscedasticity. 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of equation (5) for Chinese commercial 
banks. All independent and control variables are lagged by one year. The Lerner 
index and the net interest margin are highly correlated such that they enter the 
regression model separately in model 1 and model 2. HHI is negatively related to 
financial soundness, while both the Lerner index and net interest margin have 
positive and significant effects on the Z score. Our interpretation of the results is 
that while the higher degree of market concentration may have a negative effect on 
the financial stability of the entire banking system, an individual bank’s ability to 
earn higher markups or charge a higher net interest margin contributes to its 
financial soundness. 
Among the bank-specific variables, the loan-to-asset ratio has a negative effect 
on the Z-score, whereas larger banks or banks with more branches tend to be 
financially more stable than smaller banks. The ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans (NPL) is negatively and significantly linked to the degree of financial 
stability. None of the macroeconomic variables are statistically significant. The 
GDP growth rate has a positive effect, while the inflation rate has a negative effect 
on the Z score, though neither is statistically significant. A dummy variable, 
CRISIS, has a negative but insignificant effect on the Z-score, which indicates that 
Chinese banks were not affected as much by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1998 as the banks of many other Asian countries. The second dummy variable, 
Post-2000, distinguishing the pre-2000 period and the post-2000 period, is positive 
and significant.  
Category Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Competition Variables Lerner Index 1.031** 
(0.001) 
 
Net Interest Margin  
 
0.121** 
(0.003) 
Concentration Variable HHI (Assets) -0.238* 
(0.046) 
-0.306* 
(0.049) 
Bank-Specific Variables Loans/ Assets -0.137* 
(0.046) 
-0.148* 
(0.038) 
ln Branch 0.264* 
(0.037) 
0.314* 
(0.032) 
NPL -0.061** 
(0.007) 
-0.053** 
(0.008) 
Macroeconomic Variables GDP Growth Rate 0.069 
(0.144) 
0.125 
(0.123) 
Inflation Rate -0.102 
(0.197) 
-0.088 
(0.156) 
Dummy Variables CRISIS -0.057 
(0.115) 
-0.062 
(0.157) 
Post-2000 
 
0.129* 
(0.032) 
0.152* 
(0.040) 
Adj. R2  0.842 0.827 
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VII. Summary and Conclusion 
 
Worldwide financial liberalization and financial globalization caused fierce 
competition among banks all over the world. This necessitated bank mergers and 
consolidation within a country and across countries to achieve scale efficiency so 
as to take advantage of diversification or simply to survive. The bank merger wave 
began in the U.S.A. and spread to Europe, Japan and Korea. However, this wave 
has not yet hit the Chinese banking market owing to its restricted financial 
openness and the stringent government regulations on banking. Bank mergers in 
China were typically initiated by the government rather than originating in the 
market.   
In this study, we examined the effect of market concentration on bank 
competition in China. The competitive conditions of the Chinese banking industry 
have definitely improved over time. The Chinese banking system progressed from 
a one-bank system to a four-bank system of state banks in the 1980s, transforming 
to a system with more than 20 banks, including joint-equity commercial banks, in 
the 1990s to a system with several hundred banks at the present time. This study 
finds that in spite of a drastic decrease in market concentration of the Chinese 
banking industry, its competition conditions are far from those of a competitive 
market, as evidenced by the small H statistic values. It appears that bank reforms 
have a small effect on the competitiveness of Chinese commercial banking. The 
sheer number of banks does not guarantee a competitive market. Lowering entry 
barriers for private banks and foreign banks would further facilitate competition. 
Institutional changes and lifting government regulations on banking are also 
necessary to speed up competitive behaviors in the Chinese banking market. 
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